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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Rosa L. Greub appeals from her conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine.  Specifically, she challenges the denial of her motion to 
suppress evidence. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Greub with possession of methamphetamine.  (R., 
pp. 49-50.)  She moved to suppress evidence “obtained by officers resulting from 
defendant’s contact with Pocatello Police.”  (R., pp. 51-52.)  After a hearing on 
the motion (Tr., pp. 5-46), the district court made the following factual findings: 
Defendant Rosa L. Greub (“Defendant”) was parked in a parking lot 
in Pocatello between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on June 10, 2016, 
when Officer Christ of the Pocatello Police Department drove into 
the parking lot to complete an accident report.  Upon entering, 
Officer Christ saw Defendant’s car in the back corner of the parking 
lot and saw her stare at him in what he perceived to be a startled 
manner.  Officer Christ parked his patrol car perpendicular to 
Defendant’s car, either 23 feet or 15 yards away, and did not have 
his interior [sic] lights flashing.  Officer Christ, in uniform, 
approached Defendant to ask her what her business was there.  
Defendant replied that she was on her way to work, but stopped to 
smoke a cigarette because her employer did not allow its 
employees to smoke on the premises.  Officer Christ did not see a 
cigarette and saw that Defendant was wearing a uniform.   
 
Officer Christ asked her [to] provide her driver’s license, which she 
could not provide.  Instead Defendant provided an identification 
card and confirmed that the address on it was current.  Officer 
Christ next asked if she had “anything illegal,” such as alcohol, 
drugs, or prescription medications, to which Defendant responded 
that she did not. Defendant testified at the hearing that Officer 
Christ persisted in asking her if she had anything illegal, and asked 
“If I look in your vehicle, will I find anything?”  Officer Christ testified 
that he asked Defendant if he could search her vehicle and that 
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Defendant said “Sure.”  Defendant also testified that she agreed to 
Officer Christ searching her car. 
 
During this questioning, Officer Christ observed that Defendant 
appeared nervous because she averted her eyes from him.  Officer 
Christ does not recall when he returned Defendant’s identification 
to her.   
 
After Defendant agreed to the search, Officer Christ asked 
Defendant to step out of the car, and he called a second unit to 
assist him because he was the only officer there and was not sure 
whether Defendant had any weapons.  Defendant held her purse 
as she stepped out of the car, but Officer Christ told her to leave 
her purse in the car for safety purposes, which Defendant did.  
Before the second officer, Officer Buetts, arrived, Officer Christ 
directed Defendant to stand in front of his patrol car while he began 
searching the car.  By the center console between the driver’s seat 
and passenger seat, Officer Christ saw a brown paper bag with the 
red cap of what he perceived to be a whiskey bottle protruding from 
the top.  He noted that the seal had been broken.  
 
At this time, Officer Christ stopped his search and talked with 
Defendant about the bottle he found in her car because he wanted 
backup before proceeding any further. He testified that it [was] 
standard procedure for a second officer to stay with the person 
while the other officer conducts the search for safety purposes. 
Because it was taking Officer Buetts an extended amount of time to 
arrive, Officer Christ decided to continue his search without Officer 
Buetts because he did not want to make Defendant late for work.  
Officer Christ searched behind the passenger area, then searched 
Defendant’s purse in which he found methamphetamine.  After 
arresting Defendant, Officer Buetts arrived and Officer Christ 
searched Defendant’s purse a second time and found a pipe. 
 
(R., pp. 84-86.) 
 The district court denied the suppression motion.  (R., pp. 84-99.)  
Relevant to this appeal, the district court concluded that Greub had given 
voluntary consent to search her car and the containers therein, including her 
purse, and had not revoked or limited that consent when she initially attempted to 
remove the purse from the car.  (R., pp. 90-99.)     
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 Greub entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to challenge 
the denial of the suppression motion.  (R., pp. 114, 120-21; 10/11/16 Tr., p. 1, 
Ls. 12-15.)  She filed an appeal timely from the entry of judgment.  (R., pp. 136-
38, 142-44.)   
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ISSUE 
 
 Greub states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Greub’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Greub failed to show clear error in the district court’s finding that she 
did not revoke her consent in relation to her purse? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Greub Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court’s Finding That She 
Did Not Revoke Her Consent In Relation To Her Purse 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court held that Greub’s act of grabbing her purse as she 
prepared to step out of the car was not an “unequivocal act” revoking her 
previously given consent, and “under the circumstances in this case” Greub “did 
not revoke her consent.”  (R., pp. 93-95.)  Citing cases addressing the scope of a 
search of a car incident to the arrest of the driver as “instructive,” Greub argues 
purses should be granted “special” status such that her grabbing the purse after 
she was instructed to exit the car must be interpreted as revocation of consent.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-12.)  Greub’s request for a special rule related to purses 
is without legal merit, and her argument that the district court erred when it 
reviewed all the circumstances fails.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the 
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found.”  State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).  
A district court’s finding that consent was not revoked is reviewed to determine if 
it was “clearly erroneous.”  State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477, 
480 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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C. Greub Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court’s 
Determination That Her Act Of Grabbing Her Purse Was Not An Act 
Clearly Inconsistent With The Consent She Had Just Given 
 
 “A valid consent dispels the necessity for a search warrant. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that consent—like the plain view doctrine—dispels application of 
the fourth amendment itself.”  State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 560, 716 P.2d 
1328, 1332 (Ct. App. 1986).  Because the object of the requested search 
included drugs (R., pp.85, 92), “it was objectively reasonable for the police to 
conclude that the general consent to search [Greub]’s car included consent to 
search containers within that car which might bear drugs.”  Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).  Greub does not challenge the district court’s 
determination that she gave voluntary consent to search her car, including 
containers therein.  (See, generally, Appellant’s brief.) 
 “Even if consent has been given, expressly or impliedly, it may be 
revoked, thereby terminating the authority of the police to continue a warrantless 
search.”  Rusho, 110 Idaho at 560, 716 P.2d at 1332.  “‘[C]onduct withdrawing 
consent must be an act clearly inconsistent with the apparent consent to search, 
an unambiguous statement challenging the officer’s authority to conduct the 
search, or some combination of both.’”  United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 
774 (8th Cir. 2005) (brackets original) (quoting Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d   
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741, 746–47 (D.C. App. 1994) (footnotes omitted)).1  “For example, the closing 
and locking a car trunk and the shutting of a bedroom door are acts that courts 
have held to be express revocations of consent.  Conversely, courts have held 
that an equivocal act or statement cannot reasonably be interpreted as 
conveying an indication that consent has been withdrawn.”  Burton, 657 A.2d at 
747 (citing cases).  “[E]quivocal conduct can be construed in many different ways 
and it, therefore, does not pass muster under an objective reasonableness test.”  
Id. at 748 (putting hand over pocket but then removing it when instructed not 
unequivocal withdrawal of consent).  See also Sanders, 424 F.3d at 775 
(applying unequivocal conduct standard, and finding that blocking the search of a 
pocket five times unequivocally withdrew consent). 
 The district court applied the correct legal standard and concluded Greub 
had granted consent to search the entire car, including the purse, and her 
conduct of grabbing her purse but then leaving it when instructed “was not clearly 
inconsistent with her consent to the search of her car, nor was it a clear and 
unequivocal act to prevent Officer Christ from searching her purse.”  (R., p. 95.)  
Finding the facts of the case closer to Burton than Sanders, the court held that 
Greub “did not revoke her consent.”  (Id.)  The district court’s analysis is correct. 
 Greub consented to a search of her car for “‘anything illegal’” including 
“alcohol, drugs or prescription medications.”  (R., p. 85.)  Such items could 
                                            
1 “Effective withdrawal of consent requires unequivocal conduct, in the form of 
either an act, statement, or some combination of the two, that is inconsistent with 
the consent to the search previously given.”  State v. Wellard, No. 43511, 2016 
WL 4413238, at *2 (Ct. App. 2016) (unpublished) (citing Burton, 657 A.2d at 
748).  See also State v. Lawrence, No. 38555, 2011 WL 11067233, at *2 
(Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished). 
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certainly have been in her purse, and thus the purse was within the scope of the 
search.  (R., pp. 91-92.)  After obtaining consent to search, the officer asked 
Greub “to step out of the car” so he could conduct the search.  (R., pp. 85-86.)   
Greub grabbed her purse, but the officer “told her to leave her purse in the car for 
safety purposes, which Defendant did.”  (R., p. 86.)  The officer began the 
search, and found an open container of alcohol.  (Id.)  He stopped the search to 
discuss what he had found with Greub.  (Id.)  After discussing the alcohol, the 
officer resumed the search, and searched the purse, in which he found 
methamphetamine.  (Id.)   
 Under these facts, the act of grabbing the purse after granting consent to 
search and after being instructed to step out of the car was, at best, ambiguous.  
Grabbing the purse may have been a habitual action undertaken every time 
Greub exited the car.  It may have been based on a desire to have or get 
something out of the purse (such as a cell phone or cigarettes) while she was 
waiting for the search to conclude.  It was not clearly inconsistent with the 
consent to search just given, and was therefore not an unequivocal withdrawal or 
revocation of that consent. 
 Moreover, when instructed to not take the purse (for officer safety, not to 
alter the scope of the consent), Greub did not articulate any desire that the purse 
not be searched.  Nor did she express any withdrawal of consent when the 
officer discussed the open container of alcohol he discovered in the initial stages 
of the search.  The officer’s belief that the purse was still within the scope of the 
consent when he searched it was not unreasonable under the facts of this case.  
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 Greub argues that the fact it was her purse she grabbed, as opposed to 
some other container, is enough alone to show the officer no longer reasonably 
believed the consent extended to the purse.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-12.)  
Specifically, she cites to cases addressing whether the purse of a passenger is 
within the scope of a search of a car incident to the arrest of the driver and 
contends that whether her purse could be properly searched should hinge on 
whether she voluntarily left it in the car after being instructed to exit the vehicle.  
(Id.)  This argument is not based on the applicable legal standard and does not 
withstand analysis. 
 In State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 979 P.2d 100 (1998) (cited 
Appellant’s brief, p. 9), Newsom challenged the district court’s determination that 
an officer’s search of her “purse was lawful incident to the arrest of the driver of 
the vehicle.”  Id. at 699, 979 P.2d at 101.  The Court held that the search incident 
to arrest exception “does not authorize the search of another occupant of the 
automobile merely because the other occupant was there when the arrest 
occurred.”  Id. at 700, 979 P.2d at 102.  The Court noted that Newsom had 
testified that the purse was on her lap, but when she tried to take it with her upon 
exiting the car the officers ordered she leave it behind.  Id.  Under such 
circumstances “the passenger’s purse was entitled to as much privacy and 
freedom from search and seizure as the passenger herself.”  Id. 
 The Court also addressed the search of a passenger’s purse incident to 
the arrest of the driver in State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000) 
(cited Appellant’s brief, p. 10).  In that case, however, unlike in Newsom, Holland 
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voluntarily left her purse behind when asked to exit the car.  Id. at 160, 15 P.3d at 
1168.  See also State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234-35, 127 P.3d 133, 137-38 
(2005) (cited Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11).  In reaching the opposite conclusion as 
in Newsom, the Court stated that “Newsom stands for the proposition that the 
police cannot create a right to search a container by placing it within the 
passenger compartment of a car or by ordering someone else to place it there for 
them.”  Holland, 135 Idaho at 163, 15 P.3d at 1171; see also Watts, 142 Idaho at 
235, 127 P.3d at 138 (“Watts is not entitled to the ‘exception to the Belton 
exception’ provided in Newsom, in which the officer ordered Newsom to leave 
her purse in the car.”). 
 Greub concludes that the “takeaway from Newsom, Holland, and Watts is 
that the police cannot create a right to search by thwarting an individual’s attempt 
to restrict the scope of the police’s search.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11 (internal 
quotes omitted).)  Even assuming the merits of this extrapolation,2 the flaw in this 
argument is that it begs the question.  Greub consented to a search of her car for 
alcohol and drugs, which included consent to search the purse in the car.  The 
question, then, is not whether the officer “creat[ed] a right to search” the purse by 
insisting that Greub not take it with her.  This is not what the district court held, 
and the state concedes the obvious point that the officer was bound by any 
                                            
2 The state does not believe that the cited cases stand for the proposition that a 
defendant may unilaterally “restrict the scope of the police’s search,” but rather 
merely define the legal scope of the search incident to arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement.  The state sees no obvious reason to expand cases 
defining the scope of the search incident to arrest exception to also define the 
scope of consent.  See State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, 357 P.3d 1281 
(Ct. App. 2015) (declining to extend the rationale of Newsom to the context of the 
automobile exception). 
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withdrawal of consent.  The relevant question is whether Greub withdrew the 
previously granted consent by attempting to take the purse with her.  Greub does 
not argue how the grabbing of the purse was a withdrawal of consent, but merely 
assumes it was.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11 (grabbing the purse when being asked 
to exit the car “was an attempt to restrict [the] search of it”).)  This mere 
assumption falls far short of meeting Greub’s burden of showing clear error in the 
district court’s finding that her act of grabbing the purse, under the circumstances 
of this case, was not an unequivocal withdrawal of consent. 
 The district court applied the correct legal standards and concluded that 
Greub’s act of grabbing her purse when asked to exit the car was not an act 
clearly inconsistent with the previously granted consent to search.  Greub does 
not challenge this finding as clear error under the relevant legal standards, but 
instead requests application of a legal standard that she has failed to show is 
relevant.  Greub has failed to show clear error by the district court. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Greub’s judgment of 
conviction. 
 DATED this 24th day of May, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of May, 2017, served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 JENNY C. SWINFORD 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.  
 
 
 
      __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
KKJ/dd 
